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Refugee determination systems around the worldshare two common features: complexity and un-fairness. These features have bedevilled each form
that the Canadian refugee determination procedure has
taken through the years.
The old Canadian refugee determination procedure,
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada
because of its unfairness, was as complex a system as could
be imagined. It was a Rube Goldberg device in which the
roundabout took precedence over the direct.
Under that old procedure, a person had to violate the
Immigration Act to make a refugee claim. By statute, a per-
son could make a claim only if the person was before an
adjudication tribunal convened to decide whether a viola-
tion of the Immigration Act had taken place.
In order not to create artificial incentives to violate the
act, the department, by policy, instituted an in-status refu-
gee determination system. However, the in-status system
could not supplant the out-of-status statutory system, only
complement it. So once the in-status procedure was in place,
a person could make two refugee claims: one in-status, and
a second out-of-status.
The immigration inquiry that triggered the out-of-
status claim did not conclude with the issuance of a condi-
tional order, as now. Rather, the inquiry just adjourned af-
ter the claim and a decision that there was a violation of
the Immigration Act. The inquiry had to be reconvened
after the refugee determination for a decision whether there
would be a removal order or departure notice.
Both in-status and out-of-status refugee claims were
made initially by talking into a tape recorder. The claimant
would be convened to an interview conducted by a senior
immigration officer who would tape the interview and have
a transcript prepared. The transcript would be sent to the
claimant for comment and then forwarded to Ottawa to a
committee for its advice: the Refugee Status Advisory Com-
mittee. The committee, after reading the transcript, would
advise the minister of Immigration, who would decide the
claim.
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Abstract
Refugee determination systems are complex and unfair.
This combination is surprising. Why has government after
government in Canada and around the world generated
refugee determination systems that are both complex and
unfair? The answer is that governments intrude into
systems that would otherwise be both simple and fair, in
order to assert control. They assert control in order to
achieve other, non-refugee protection objectives. These non-
refugee protection objectives are inappropriate for the
design of a refugee determination system. A refugee deter-
mination system should be devised with four objectives in
mind: fairness, internal consistency, simplicity, and compli-
ance with international standards. The article examines
Bill c-31 and makes recommendations for its improvement
with these objectives in mind.
Résumé
Les systèmes pour la détermination du statut de réfugié
sont complexes et injustes. Cette combinaison est
surprenante. Comment se fait-il que gouvernement après
gouvernement au Canada et partout dans le monde aient
engendré des systèmes de détermination qui soient com-
plexes et injustes ? La réponse est que les gouvernements
s’ingèrent dans des systèmes qui seraient autrement simples
et équitables dans le but d’affirmer leur contrôle. Ils
affirment leur contrôle afin d’atteindre d’autres fins qui
n’ont rien à voir avec la protection des réfugiés. Ces fins
non-liés à la protection des réfugiés sont impropres à la
création d’un système de détermination du statut de
réfugié. Un système de détermination du statut de réfugié
devrait être conçu en tenant en ligne de compte quatre
objectifs : équité, cohérence interne, simplicité et conformité
à des normes internationales. L’article examine le projet de
loi c-31 et formule des recommandations pour son
amélioration en tenant en ligne de compte ces objectifs.
If the decision of the minister was negative, and it al-
most always was, the claimant then could apply for rede-
termination to the old Immigration Appeal Board. The
application was on paper only. This paper application was
not for a reversal of the decision but for an oral hearing
only. The application was akin to a leave application, but
the test for success was a good deal higher than for a leave
application. The Immigration Appeal Board could grant
an oral hearing only if there were reasonable grounds to
believe, on the basis of the paper application, that the claim-
ant, at the oral hearing, could succeed in the claim.
If the Immigration Appeal Board rejected the paper ap-
plication, as was most often the case, or held an oral hear-
ing and then rejected the case, the person then went back
to the immigration adjudicator for a decision on whether
a removal order or departure notice would issue. Of course,
beyond all that there was recourse to the Federal Court.
Most people went through this system without ever ap-
pearing in front of anyone who decided their claim—a fea-
ture that attracted the attention of the Supreme Court of
Canada. In addition, if one totals every step a person took
who was rejected at every turn, there were twelve in all,
even when there was no attempt to seek a remedy from the
Federal Court. They were:
1. an in-status interview
2. a submission on the transcript of that interview
3. the advice of the Refugee Status Advisory Commit-
tee on the transcript
4. the decision of the minister on that advice
5. an immigration inquiry at which an out-of-status
claim was made
6. an out-of-status interview
7. a submission on the transcript of that out-of-status
interview
8. the advice of the Refugee Status Advisory Commit-
tee on the second transcript
9. the decision of the minister on that advice
10. an application for redetermination to the Immigra-
tion Appeal Board
11. a hearing of the claim by the Immigration Appeal
Board, on the assumption that the application for
redetermination was granted
12. the resumption of the immigration inquiry before
an adjudicator to determine whether there should
be a departure notice or deportation order
This system, bizarre as it sounds, is similar to refugee
determination systems found elsewhere. Indeed, this ear-
lier Canadian model was inspired by foreign refugee deter-
mination systems. There are even some people in Canada
today nostalgic for the old system and regretful of the Su-
preme Court of Canada intrusion into it.
The old system, in addition to all its other faults, suf-
fered from an absence of integration of the overseas and
inland refugee determination systems. Overseas refugee
determinations, performed at Canadian visa posts abroad,
were made by different people using different procedures,
standards, and criteria.
The inland system was so long, drawn out, and unfair
that virtually everyone was being rejected, but virtually no
one was being removed. The system was completely dys-
functional and had to be revamped, even without the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada ruling it unfair.
The system in the present act and regulations is an im-
provement, but still needlessly complex and needlessly
unfair. The present act creates a bifurcated road. The
number of steps depends on which of the two roads the
claimant is required to take.
Under the present act, first there is a port-of-entry in-
terview, where claimants are interviewed on arrival about
the substance of their claims without access to counsel, a
procedure the Supreme Court of Canada has decided is
constitutionally valid. Second there is eligibility determi-
nation, conducted by a senior immigration officer.
A determination of eligibility puts claimants on one of
the two roads. If the person is eligible, there is the refugee
hearing conducted by the Refugee Division of the Immi-
gration and Refugee Board. If the claim is rejected, the per-
son can apply for membership in the post-claims refugee
determination in Canada class. The decision on member-
ship in the post-claims refugee determination in Canada
class is made by a specialized corps of officers in the De-
partment of Immigration: the post-claims determinations
officers (pcdos).
A person can make a claim either in-status or at an im-
migration inquiry. If the claim is made at the inquiry, then
the adjudicator issues a conditional removal order. If the
claim fails, the order becomes effective without the need to
reconvene the inquiry.
Those found not eligible have risk determined differ-
ently from those found eligible. One ground of ineligibil-
ity is that the person has committed an offence with a maxi-
mum punishment of ten years or more and has been de-
termined by the minister to be a public danger. A person
found ineligible to make a refugee claim is also ineligible
to apply for membership in the post-determination refu-
gee claimants in Canada class. It is this public danger de-
termination procedure that becomes, instead, the risk de-
termination procedure.
Refugee Determination Complexity
49
Volume 19 Refuge Number 4
50
The public danger procedure starts with a determina-
tion in the local immigration office to seek the advice of
the minister that the person is a public danger. The person
concerned is notified of this determination with an op-
portunity to make written submissions that would be for-
warded to the minister. The written submissions are sent
to headquarters where they are analyzed, and advisory opin-
ion is given. The minister or her delegate decides.
As can be seen, in this process there is never a stand-
alone risk assessment. Rather, risk assessment is folded into
the public danger determination. The ultimate decision is
only that the person is or is not a public danger. Further-
more, the decision on public danger does not involve the
department’s risk-analysis specialists—the post-claims de-
termination officers.
In order to engage their involvement, the person con-
cerned has to make a second application, this time for per-
manent residence on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds. It is the policy of the department, when an appli-
cation is made for humanitarian landing and the applica-
tion has a risk component, to refer the risk component of
the application to the post-claims determination officers
for their advice.
The Immigration Act, in general, prevents removal of a
rejected refugee claimant pending consideration of his or
her application to the Federal Court. There are statutory
stays of execution of removal orders. However, persons
found ineligible to make a refugee claim on the basis that
they are public dangers are not granted statutory stays. They
must apply for judicial stays. Furthermore, an application
for humanitarian landing, in itself, does not prevent ex-
ecution of a removal order.
In consequence, the application for a judicial stay of ex-
ecution of a removal order becomes part of the process of
risk determination. Recourse to the Federal Court becomes
a necessary part of the process rather than a step to be taken
after the process is completed. Unless a person can stay in
Canada pending his or her humanitarian application, the
person never gets recourse to a decision reached on the
advice of the post-claims determination officers. The de-
partment does not attempt to remove some people pend-
ing their humanitarian applications. However, as the docket
of the Federal Court shows, for many, it does.
Again, with this system, there is no integration with the
overseas system and the inland system. Indeed, though the
inland system has changed substantially, the overseas sys-
tem has remained much the same. There has been a broad-
ening of the risk standards. However, other criteria remain
in place, and the procedure is unchanged.
This lack of integration creates its own perversity. It is a
policy of the Immigration Act to have applications for im-
migration processed at visa posts abroad, rather than in-
land. Yet, the refugee determination system overseas is much
more problematic than the system inland.
The system is a good deal less fair. For instance, there is
no right to counsel at refugee interviews, and most visa
posts, as a matter of policy, prevent counsel from attend-
ing, even if they are available at the time of the scheduled
interview.
The persons who decide are neither specialized nor ex-
pert in refugee matters and have only cursory training in
the field. They are not independent from government and
its immigration and foreign affairs objectives, but rather
part of government and part of that very portion of gov-
ernment that pursues immigration and foreign policy ob-
jectives.
The visa posts impose criteria that are not part of the
inland determination. Examples are medical admissibility,
likelihood of successful establishment, and no durable so-
lution elsewhere.
It is a good deal harder to be recognized as a refugee
overseas than inland, and for all the wrong reasons. The
system gives an artificial incentive for claimants to come to
Canada to make their claims, working at cross-purposes
with the overall objective of the system to have applica-
tions processed at visa posts abroad.
The present system is fairer than the old one, for at least
some people. For those found to be public dangers, the
present system is as unfair as the old system, and then some.
For those who are found to be eligible, there is a fair hear-
ing before an independent expert tribunal. The system is
not completely fair, because of the denial of access to coun-
sel at the initial port of entry interview, the absence of an
appeal, and the impossibility of reopening to consider
change of circumstances, new evidence, or old evidence not
previously available.
As well, the present system is still needlessly complex. It
is not as complex as the old system. However, there are still
many unnecessary steps, consuming time and money for
no apparent purpose.
Superficially, this combination of complexity and un-
fairness is surprising. It is easy to fathom, if not to com-
mend, a system that is both fair and complex or simple
and unfair. In a system that is both fair and complex, the
complexity can be justified by the fairness. In a system that
is both simple and unfair, there would be at least some who
would attempt to justify the unfairness by the simplicity.
However, why has government after government in Canada
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and around the world generated refugee determination
systems that are both complex and unfair?
The reason is the intrusion into these systems of yet an-
other objective besides simplicity and fairness: the objec-
tive of control. Governments intrude into a system that
would otherwise be both simple and fair, in order to assert
control over the system.
The reason for that attempt to assert control is that refu-
gee protection systems impinge upon other government
policy objectives. Refugee claimants who get protection get
to stay. Those who get to stay become part of the local com-
munity. The governments want a say in who gets to stay.
So they intrude into refugee determination systems in or-
der to attempt to realize their immigration objectives.
As well, a decision that a person is a refugee is a decision
that the country of danger fled is a country of persecution.
For some governments, that is a judgment that they would
rather not have made of their allies. Refugee determina-
tion can conflict with foreign policy objectives.
For Canada, immigration and foreign policy concerns
are less than for many others. Canada attempts to promote
human rights abroad in a neutral fashion. Canada is a coun-
try of immigration. Recognizing refugees can support
Canada’s foreign affairs and immigration policies rather
than contradict them.
As well, it is not that easy to get to Canada. The only
country with which Canada has a land border is the United
States, which does not produce refugees. Every refugee
claimant coming to Canada has to either traverse the United
States or arrive by air or sea.
The number of those arriving by air or sea can be con-
trolled by visa requirements and carrier sanctions. Canada
has visa requirements on every country producing signifi-
cant numbers of refugee claimants; denies visas systemati-
cally to everyone who wants to come to Canada to make a
refugee claim; and penalizes commercial carriers who bring
to Canada persons who need visas but do not have them.
This interconnected web of visa requirements, visa deni-
als, and carrier sanctions reduces the number of arrivals to
Canada to the point where, even if Canada were to accept
as a refugee every refugee claimant that got to Canada, the
numbers would be manageable.
The Canadian policy concerns about immigration num-
bers from refugee recognition inland, as a result, are inap-
propriate. To a large extent, the present design of the in-
land refugee determination system manages to avoid an
unwarranted intrusion of immigration considerations into
refugee determinations because, at least for those eligible
to make a claim, risk determination is done by an inde-
pendent tribunal—the Immigration and Refugee Board—
and not the Immigration Department.
Immigration concerns intrude more readily into refu-
gee determination overseas because those refugees
determinations are done by visa officers who otherwise
decide on immigration matters. Many refugees abroad, as
well as in Canada, would not qualify for permanent resi-
dence if they were not refugees. That should not matter
and, in general, does not matter to members of the Refu-
gee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. It is,
however, something that tugs at the minds of visa officers.
It becomes impossible for many, if not most, visa officers
to separate their refugee protection tasks from their immi-
gration tasks.
It is this failure to separate refugee determination from
immigration that explains the superficial perversity of a
system that works with much less success abroad than in
Canada. Officials seem not to care that the system creates
an incentive to get to Canada, because they know that the
web of visa requirements, visa denials, and carrier sanc-
tions will prevent the arrival of most of those who want to
come.
The other policy concern that unduly intrudes into Ca-
nadian refugee protection is a concern about criminality.
International law says that no one, no matter what the
crime, should be returned to torture, disappearance, or
arbitrary execution. Refugees who are also criminals can
be returned to danger, but only if the danger they face on
return is less than the danger they pose to the community
where they seek protection. For Canadian policy makers,
this protection of criminals goes too far. Canadian law in-
trudes into refugee protection to prevent it from happening.
We should approach the refugee determination system
with these objectives in mind: The system should be fair. It
should be simple. It should comply with international law
standards. It should be consistent and integrated, not work-
ing at cross-purposes.
The system proposed in the government’s Bill c-31, in-
troduced in the last Parliament, though in some respects
an improvement over the present law, is still not quite right.
It is still needlessly complex and unnecessarily unfair. It
suffers from a lack of integration. And it does not fully com-
ply with standards of international law.
The proposed system, like the old one, creates a bifur-
cated road. Some claimants will be found eligible and go
through one form of risk determination at the level of the
Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board.
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Other claimants will be found ineligible and go through
another form of risk determination—an administrative
pre-removal risk assessment.
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the old system,
like the new one, creates a trifurcated road. A third group
of claimants go down a third, dead-end, road. At the end
of this third road there is removal without any form of risk
assessment whatsoever.
The criterion for public danger disappears. Bill c-31,
though removing the public danger label, makes matters
worse. Rather than a there being a double hurdle for ineli-
gibility, as there is now, of a crime with a high maximum
sentence plus a public danger determination, there will be
only a single hurdle of a conviction of a crime with a high
maximum sentence.
Under the bill, once a person is declared ineligible, the
person goes into a different risk determination stream. Risk
determination is made not by the Protection Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board, but through pre-
removal risk assessment. The bill gives the power to decide
on pre-removal risk assessment to the minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration, but also allows her to delegate that
power to decide. Under the bill, the definition of risk that
both the Protection Division of the Immigration and Refu-
gee Board and pre-removal risk assessment officials would
consider is the same.
So, the bill contemplates two streams of claimants, go-
ing into two different determination systems where the risk
definition applied would be the same, and where the pro-
cedure for application of the definition could be the same.
Furthermore, eligible but rejected refugee claimants would
be able to go into pre-removal risk assessment, in effect
getting two refugee determinations.
As problematic as fragmentation of the refugee deter-
mination system is, even more problematic is the situation
of those who are unable to squeeze into any one of the
fragments. Those rejected as refugees or found ineligible
to make a claim, as well as those who have abandoned or
withdrawn their claims, cannot apply for refugee determi-
nation if they have left Canada and then returned. They
cannot apply for pre-removal risk assessment either, where
the return is within a year of the departure.
Another gap in protection, both under the present law
and the bill, is protection from danger for a person recog-
nized as a convention refugee by another country who can
be returned to that country. The gap should be addressed.
To do that, we need an amendment to the definition of “a
person in need of protection” in the bill.
In addition to the unnecessary steps of ineligibility and
pre-removal risk assessment, with roughly parallel steps in
the present system, the bill adds a new step not found in
the present system. It is the need to apply for a judicial stay
of execution of a removal order to keep the person in
Canada pending an application for leave and judicial re-
view of a negative refugee determination by the Refugee
Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board.
The bill, like all its predecessors, does little to address
the connection between the refugee determination over-
seas and refugee determination in Canada. Indeed, although
the bill provides a common definition for refugee protec-
tion, it puts claimants outside Canada through the proce-
dures and provisions of part 1 of the act dealing with im-
migrants and not through part 2 of the act dealing with
refugees.
What follows are specific recommendations about Bill
c-31 in line with this general approach, dividing them
among the four objectives stated. Some of these recom-
mendations, of course, serve more than one objective.
Simplification
1. Everyone in Canada should be eligible to make a refu-
gee claim. There should be no ineligibility step before refu-
gee determination. The eligibility step is unnecessary for
most claimants, since most claimants are eligible. The step
just takes up time and money.
People ineligible because of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or serious non-political crimes committed be-
fore entry can be denied refugee protection under the con-
vention exclusion clauses. A person ineligible to make a
refugee claim if the person has been found to be a conven-
tion refugee by another country, and can be returned to
that country, can be dealt with under the Refugee Conven-
tion clause, excluding from the refugee definition those
having the rights and obligations attached to the posses-
sion of nationality of another country.
People who have committed serious crimes in Canada
and are a danger to Canada, and people who are security
risks, can be removed from Canada even if refugees. Refu-
gee determination in this case assists in the decision whether
to remove by providing an assessment of the gravity of risk
faced on return.
People who have passed through a designated safe third
country are ineligible under the present act, but no coun-
try has ever been designated, for good reason. None ever
should be. Safety should always be determined case by case,
for every country of return.
People already recognized or refused as refugees can be
dealt with through the doctrine of res judicata. The doc-
trine of res judicata does not prevent the examination of
new evidence. It does prevent the relitigation of old issues
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between the same parties on the same evidence. No tribu-
nal will again hear a case it has already decided simply be-
cause a party requests the rehearing.
People who have withdrawn or abandoned claims can
be dealt with through the doctrine of abuse of process.
Again the doctrine of abuse of process does not prevent
reconsideration of a case withdrawn or abandoned, if there
is good reason for reinstituting the case. It does prevent
coming to court constantly on a whim.
2. There should be no administrative pre-removal risk
assessment procedure but instead a re-opening jurisdic-
tion in the Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board paralleling the existing re-opening jurisdic-
tion of the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refu-
gee Board. That is to say, there should be a power to reo-
pen, on application, where there is a change of circum-
stances in the country of claim, new evidence in support
of the claim, or old evidence not previously available.
3. It should not be necessary to apply for a discretionary
stay to the Federal Court. There should be, as now, a statu-
tory stay pending applications for leave.
Fairness
4. There should be a right to counsel at port of entry
refugee interviews.
5. If there is an administrative pre-removal risk assess-
ment procedure, there should be an oral hearing under this
procedure, at the very least, for those who had no oral hear-
ing from the Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board.
6. Even if there is an administrative pre-removal risk
assessment procedure that considers change of country
conditions, there should be a reopening jurisdiction in the
board to consider new evidence or old evidence not previ-
ously available. It is difficult for an instance that has not
made the original determination to decide whether or not
new evidence or old evidence not previously available
would change that determination.
7. In order to ensure a refugee determination procedure
that brings to its task no bias, or reasonable apprehension
of bias, Parliament should legislate a transparent, profes-
sional, and accountable selection procedure for members
of the Immigration and Refugee Board.
8. It should be possible to appeal from abandonment
decisions. Abandonment can be hotly contested. A claim-
ant may not show up for a prior hearing because he or she
never received notice of the hearing. The board must then
decide whether what the claimant did to maintain contact
with the board in order to receive notice was reasonable in
the circumstances. An appeal from a contested abandon-
ment decision where risk is at issue, is as appropriate as an
appeal from the risk decision itself.
9. A person should be allowed to make a refugee claim,
whether or not the person is under a removal order. Often
whether such a claim is made or not depends on the per-
son’s awareness of his or rights at the time of removal pro-
ceedings. A removal order can be made on arrival, at the
port of entry, before the claimant has had access to coun-
sel. The denial of substantive rights should not depend on
procedural vagaries.
Compliance with International Law
10. If there is both an eligibility stage and an adminis-
trative pre-removal risk assessment stage, everyone who is
ineligible for consideration by the Protection Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board should be eligible for
consideration under the pre-removal risk assessment pro-
cedure. No one at risk should be removed from Canada
without assessment of that risk.
11. The bill should grant both the power to prevent re-
moval to generalized risk and to risk that may not be so
general as to put everyone at risk, but general enough to be
faced “generally by other individuals in or from that coun-
try,” that is to say those similarly situate to the claimant.
The risk may not be faced by the foreign national in every
part of the country, but it may be faced in the part of the
country to which the department would remove the appli-
cant, the place where the international airport is to be
found.
As well, there should be provision to allow for suspen-
sion of removals based on the application of individuals. It
should be possible for a decision on suspension to be re-
sponsive to the testimony that individual refugee claim-
ants have to give.
12. There needs to be mechanism for dealing with dan-
ger in a country that has granted the person refugee status
and to which the person could be returned, but for that
danger. One way of dealing with that danger is through the
definition of a person in need of protection. The defini-
tion of person in need of protection could read, “A person
in need of protection is a foreign national in Canada whose
removal to any country to which the person can be removed
would subject her personally . . . ”
13. For generalized risk, in addition to gaps in protec-
tion coverage, there are failings in due process, now and in
the proposed bill. The present power to prevent removal
to generalized risk has been exercised in an opaque and
arbitrary fashion, behind closed doors. Individuals are faced
with a decision that they do not request and to which they
do not contribute.
There needs to be an open and fair procedure to invoke
the power to prevent removal to generalized risk. This pro-
cedure should be part of the refugee determination proc-
ess. Every claimant should be able to request a determina-
tion that the risk the person faces would be faced by the
person in every part of that country and is faced generally
by other individuals in or from that country.
14. The bill should prohibit the removal of anyone to
torture, arbitrary execution, or disappearance. As men-
tioned earlier, international law prohibits such removal.
Integration with the System Overseas
15. Refugee determinations overseas should be done by
the Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board, using the same procedures as in Canada.
16. At the very least, the bill should recognize there is a
right to counsel at refugee interviews at visa posts abroad.
17. As long as the refugee determination procedure over-
seas remains the same as it is now, the bill should provide
for eligibility to make an inland claim where the person is
rejected overseas.
Conclusion
There was an elaborate policy process leading up to Bill c-
31. The bill was preceded by the report of an independent
Legislative Review Advisory Group and a ministerial white
paper. Both involved extensive cross-Canada consultations.
Yet, the new bill suffered from the same vices as the
present legislation: complexity, unfairness, internal incon-
sistency, and deviance from international standards. It
seems that even the most extensive review and consulta-
tions could not shake the policy makers from a few strongly
held beliefs, though it was those very beliefs that had led to
the current impasse.
What is needed now is not just a new bill, but new think-
ing. Immigration and refugee reform has for so long been
mired in the past, it is hard to be optimistic that a new day
will dawn.
David Matas is a lawyer in private practice in Winnipeg
and a contributor to the Canadian Bar Association brief on
Bill c-31.
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